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[38 C.2d 73; 237 P.2d 510] 
[L. A. No. 21561. In Bank. Nov. 21, 1951.] 
NEW YORK LIPE INSURANCE COMP .ANY, .Appellant, ·v. 
LEO HOLLENDER, Respondent. 
[1] Insurance- Incontestability Provisions.- The incontestable 
clause of an insurance contract, after the lapse of time it 
specifies, prevents nullification of the contract for any cause 
not excepted by the clause. 
[2] !d.-Incontestability Provisions.-Every resistance by an in-
surer against a claim of an insured or beneficiary is not a 
contest of the policy within the meaning of an incontestable 
clause, that is, a contest against the terms of the policy for 
the purpose of destroying its validity as distinguished from 
a contest for or in favor of the terms of the policy for the 
purpose of securing its enforcement. 
[3] !d.-Incontestability Provisions.-When an insurance policy 
by its provisions is made incontestable after a specified period, 
the intent of the parties is to fix a limited time within which 
the insurer must discover and assert any grounds it may 
have to justify a rescission of the contract. The insurer must 
contest the policy within the prescribed period, either by the 
institution of a suit to cancel the policy or by setting up mis-
representation or fraud in the procurement of the policy 
as a defense to an action brought by the insured or beneficiary. 
[4] Id.-Rescission.-An insured's understatement of his age is 
not ground for rescission of an insurance policy under the 
terms of which the insurer is expressly obligated to pay the 
amount of insurance which the premiums paid would purchase 
at the insured's correct age. 
[5] !d.-Incontestability Provisions.-An incontestable clause in 
a life insurance policy does not invalidate, or prevent enforce-
ment of, an age adjustment clause or provision. 
[6] !d.-Incontestability Provisions.-The distinction between a 
contest of an insurance policy and a controversy as to the 
policy coverage rests on the principle that where there has 
been no assumption of risk, there can be no liability. 
[1] See 29 Am.Jur. 681. 
[5] Age adjustment clause of policy as affected by incontestable 
clause, note, 135 A.L.R. 445. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5, 6, 10] Insurance, § 54.1; [4] In-
surance, § 110; [7] Insurance, §56; [8] Insurance, § 60; [9] Con-
tracts, § 127; [11, 12] Insurance, §53. 
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[7] !d.-Interpretation of Contract.---In construing life insurancP 
policies, as in construing other contracts, the entire contract 
is to be construed together for the purpose of giving force 
and effect to each clause. ( Civ. Code, § 1641.) 
[8] !d.-Interpretation of Contract.-In case of doubt, the provi-
sions of an insurance contract will be construed most strongly 
against the insurer; but where the terms of the policy are 
plain and explicit, the court will indulge in no forced con-
struction so as to cast a liability upon the insurance company 
which it has not assumed. 
[9] Contracts-Interpretation-Intention of Parties.-In the in-
terpretation of any written instrument, the primary object is 
to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. ( Civ. 
Code, § 1636.) 
[10] Insurance-Incontestability Provisions-Effect of Age Ad-
justment Clause.-The age adjustment clause in a life insur-
ance contract does not conflict with the incontestable clause 
but rather, as an independent provision of the insurance con-
tract, it expresses the parties' agreement for the correction 
of errors consistent with their rights and obligations during 
the life of the policy. 
[11] !d.-Reformation of Contract.-In an action to reform a life 
insurance policy to reflect the true age of the insured for the 
purpose of establishing the risk assumed under an age adjust-
ment clause, the court errs in excluding admissions as to the 
date of his birth made by the insured on documentary state-
ments other than the insurance contract. · 
[12] !d.-Reformation of Contract.-In an action to reform a life 
insurance policy to reflect the true age of the insured for the 
purpose of establishing the risk assumed under an age adjust-
ment clause, the principle of decision cannot be affected by 
the fact that, if the insurer prevails in its proof on the age 
issue, it will succeed in avoiding the payment of disability 
benefits and the waiver of premiums provided in the policy. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. .Joseph Marchetti, Judge pro tem.* 
Reversed. 
Action for reformation of an insurance contract. Judgment 
for defendant reversed. 
[7] See 14 Cal.Jur. 440; 29 Am.Jur. 171. 
"Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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Meserve, Mumper & Hughes and C. Avery Crary for 
Appellant. 
Newlin, Holley, Sandmeyer & Tackabury, Keesling & Kees-
ling, Henry H. Childress, George W. Tackabury and Hudson 
B. Cox, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Leo M. Zinner, Walley & Davis and Milton Davis for Re-
spondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiff brought this action to reform an 
insurance policy issued on the life of defendant Leo Hollender. 
Specifically, it sought a reduction in the face amount of the 
policy so as to conform with the alleged true age of the insured. 
Defendant cross-complained for the amount of total and per-
manent disability payments allegedly due under the policy, 
and for the refund of premiums allegedly paid to prevent 
forfeiture of the policy. The trial court, sitting without a 
jury, granted a motion for nonsuit on the complaint and 
made findings in favor of the insured on the issues embraced 
in the cross-complaint and the answer thereto. Judgment 
in favor of defendant was entered accordingly and from such 
judgment, plaintiff has appealed. 
This case presents for determination the question of whether 
the incontestable clause of the policy bars the right of plaintiff 
to adjust the amount payable under the insurance contract 
in accordance with the provisions of the age adjustment clause 
thereof. The trial court adopted the theory of defendant 
insured in holding that the reformation sought by plaintiff 
constituted a contest of the policy after the time limitation 
therefor had expired, and that plaintiff therefore was pre-
cluded from inquiry into the correctness of defendant's state-
ment of age. In challenge of such view, plaintiff maintains 
that it is not contesting the provisions of the policy but is 
only seeking to confine its liability within the express terms 
thereof-to enforce the insurance contract in accordance with 
its coverage and the risk assumed-and that therefore the 
incontestable clause does not apply in bar of its claim for 
reformation. An analysis of the policy sustains the propriety 
of plaintiff's argument, and we therefore conclude that the 
judgment must be reversed. 
On April 16, 1931, plaintiff issued a life insurance policy, 
with provision for certain disability benefits, to defendant 
Leo Hollender. In his application for such policy made on 
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April 10, 1931, defendant stated that he was born in Russia 
on April 27, 1886, and that his age as of his nearest birthday 
was 45 years. The policy was in the face amount of $5,000, 
and the disability payments were fixed at $50 per month, 
with the proviso that defendant's total and permanent dis-
ability must have begun before the anniversary of the policy 
on which his age at nearest birthday was 60 and prior to 
the maturity of the contract, and in which event plaintiff 
would then waive the payment of future premiums. The policy 
contained these further pertinent provisions: 
''Age. If the age of the insured has been misstated, the 
amount payable hereunder shall be such as the premium paid 
would have purchased at the correct age. 
"The Contract. The Policy and the application therefor, 
copy of which is attached hereto, constitute the entire contract. 
''Incontestability. This Policy shall be incontestable after 
two years from its date of issue except for non-payment of 
premium and except as to the provisions and conditions relat-
ing to Disability and Double Indemnity Benefits.'' 
By stipulation of the parties, it is conceded that defendant 
became totally and permanently disabled on June 15, 1945, 
within the meaning of the policy, and that on December 16, 
1945, defendant filed with plaintiff his proof and claim for 
disability benefits, with demand for the scheduled $50 monthly 
payments and the specified waiver of premiums. Upon in-
vestigation of defendant's claim and the conclusion that his 
total and permanent disability did not occur within the pre-
scribed age period, plaintiff refused defendant's demand. The 
policy was not then in default and defendant continued to 
make premium payments so as to avoid cancellation. 
Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action for reformation 
of the policy. It alleged that defendant was in fact born on 
April 27, 1884, and it asked that the policy be reformed to 
reflect that age qualification: by changing the face value of 
the policy from $5,000 to $4,632 (the amount of insurance 
which the premiums paid would have purchased at the cor-
rected age, that is, 47 instead of 45 years at the time of 
defendant's original application for the insurance). In answer 
to plaintiff's complaint, defendant denied the alleged mis-
statement of age and claimed that he ''did not become sixty 
years of age until April, 1946," which would accord with the 
representation made at the time he applied for insurance with 
plaintiff. Defendant then cross-complained for the payment 
of disability payments, the refund of the premium allegedly 
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paid to prevent cancellation of the policy, and the waiver of 
the obligation to pay future premiums. At the trial plaintiff 
attempted to introduce certain documentary evidence wherein 
defendant had stated his birthdate as April, 1884. Such 
documentary evidence included his declaration of intention 
to become a citizen of the United States made in 1910, his 
petition for naturalization in 1914, and his World War I 
draft registration in 1918. Defendant's objection to this evi-
dence-offered by plaintiff in support of its claim for reforma-
tion of the policy and its contention that defendant's total 
and permanent disability occurred subsequently to the anni-
versary of the policy nearest his sixtieth birthday-was sus-
tained on the ground that the incontestable clause of the 
policy barred plaintiff from disputing defendant's statement 
of age as made in his insurance application. In line with 
such ruling, the trial court found that ''at the time of com-
mencement of ... disability, defendant's ... age at near-
est birthday was fifty-nine years," and that he was entitled 
to recovery on his cross-complaint. Defendant's age was 
properly an issue for determination by the court as a matter 
of fact, and plaintiff's proffered evidence thereon was im-
properly excluded. 
[1] It is generally held that the incontestable clause, after 
the lapse of time it specifies, prevents nullification of the 
insurance contract for any cause not excepted in the clause. 
(29 Am.Jur. p. 674, § 881; 45 C.J.S. p. 758, § 747a; 1 Apple-
man, Insurance Law and Practice, ch. 17, p. 383, § 331; 
111etropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shalloway (C.C.A. 5th), 151 
F.2d 548, 550; Dibble v. Rel1:ance Life Ins. Co., 170 Cal. 199, 
208 [149 P. 171, Ann.Cas. 1917E 34]; Goodley v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal.2d 269, 272 [70 P.2d 602] .) However, 
here plaintiff's effort is not to nullify the insurance contract, 
but recognizing its validity, to have it enforced according to 
its terms. [:2] Every resistance by the insurer against a 
claim of the insured or the beneficiary is in one sense a contest, 
but it is not a contest of the policy within the meaning of the 
"incontestable clause," that is, a contest against the terms of 
the policy for the purpose of destroying its validity as distin-
guished from a contest for or in favor of the terms of the 
policy for the purpose of securing its enforcement. (Moore v. 
Bankers' Credit Life Ins. Co., 223 Ala. 373 [136 So. 798, 799]; 
Langan v. United States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 989 [130 S.W.2d 
479, 481, 123 A.L.R. 1409]; Hall v. 111issouTi Ins. Co. (Mo. 
78 NEw YoRK LIFE INs. Co. v. HoLLENDER [38 C.2d 
App.), 208 S.W.2d 830, 833; StAan v. Occidental Life In.~. Co., 
24 N.M. 346 l171 P. 786, 787].) 
[3] When an insurance policy by its provisions is made 
incontestable after a specified period, the intent of the parties 
is to fix a limited time within which the insurer must discover 
and assert any grounds it might have to justify a rescission 
of the contract. Accordingly, the insurer must make its 
"contest of the policy" within the prescribed period, either 
by the institution of a suit to cancel the policy or by setting 
up misrepresentation or fraud in the procurement of the 
policy as a defense in an action brought by the insured or 
the beneficiary. [4] But the present case is not within the 
concept of such litigation. Rather here, defendant's alleged 
understatement of his age was not, under the terms of the 
policy, ground for its rescission by plaintiff, for the policy 
expressly obligated plaintiff to pay the amount of insurance 
which the premiums paid would have purchased at defend-
ant's "correct age." ( 1 Appleman, Insurance Law and Prac-
tice, ch. 10, p. 187, § 193; Singleton v. Prudentia.l Ins. Co., 
11 App.Div. 403 [42 N.Y.S. 446, 448]; Zolintakis v. Equi-
table Life Assttr. Soc. (C.C.A. lOth), 97 F.2d 583, 586.) 
A policy provision which measures the amount of recovery 
does not avoid the obligation of the policy. On the contrary, 
it gives the insured what his money bought at his correct age. 
The denial of liability under a policy by reason of fraud or 
misrepresentation in its procurement is the "contest" which 
is governed by the incontestable clause (Annos. 6 A.L.R. 452, 
13 A.L.R. 675, 35 A.L.R. 1492, 170 A.L.R. 1048; Goodley v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., st[pra, 9 Cal.2d 269, 272-274; mair v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal.App.2d 494, 501 [104 P.2d 
1075]; Brat[n v. New York Life Ins. Co., 46 Cal.App.2d 335, 
346 [115 P.2d 880] ; Trot[sdell v. Eqttitable Life Assur. Soc., 
55 Cal.App. 2d 74, 78-81 [130 P.2d 173]), and not the raising 
of the question of coverage afforded by the policy under 
application of the age adjustment clause. 
It appears that this precise problem has not heretofore been 
the subject of judicial review in this state. [5] However, 
the matter apparently has been adjudicated in a number of 
other jurisdictions, and while there is some conflict of judicial 
opinion, the weight of authority clearly favors the view that 
an incontestable clause in a life insurance policy does not 
invalidate, or prevent enforcement of, an age adjustment 
clause or provision. ( 45 C.J.S. p. 770, § 751b; annos. 123 
A.L.R. 1416 and 135 A.L.R. 446.) As said by Chief Justice 
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Cardozo in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 
449 [169 N.E. 642], an incontestable clause "is not a mandate 
as to coverage, a definition of the hazards to be borne by the 
insurer. It means only this, that within the limits of the 
coverage, the policy shall stand, unaffected by any defense 
that it was invalid in its inception, or thereafter became in-
valid by reason of a condition broken." (Italics added; see, 
also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shalloway (C.C.A. 5th), 
supra, 151 F.2d 548, 551; Messina v. New York Life Ins. Co., 
173 Miss. 378 [161 So. 462, 463]; New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Yeit, 294 N.Y. 222 [62 N.E.2d 45, 46].) 
In Murphy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 134 Misc. 238 [234 
N.Y.S. 278], a similar question arose as to the right of 
the insurance company to litigate the matter of the insured's 
age in the face of an incontestable clause in the policy. The 
insured took out the policy upon the representation that his 
age was 45 years when it was in fact 50. Upon his death fol-
lowing the expiration of the incontestable period, the insur-
ance company paid the reduced amount in accordance with 
the terms of the age adjustment clause in the policy, and the 
beneficiary sued for the difference. In holding that the com-
pany's resistance to payment of the full amount of insurance 
was not a ''contest'' of the policy within the prohibition of 
the incontestable clause, the court said at page 280 [234 
N.Y.S.] : "When the insured ... applied for life insurance, 
no matter what age he may have stated in his application, he 
knew that he was entitled to no more than the amount which 
he could purchase for the stipulated premium at his true age. 
This was clearly what the [company] intended when it issued 
its policy. Can it be logically said that the [company] in-
tended that this intent expressed in the contract should pre-
vail for only one year [the prescribed incontestable period]? 
I do not think so. A contrary conclusion would of necessity 
involve an intentional injustice on the part of the [company] 
to every policy holder paying premiums predicated upon true 
age. This, it seems to me, was never contemplated. 
''The claim that [the company] is contesting a contract 
contrary to its provisions is not well founded. The case might 
better be stated in this fashion: The [beneficiary] is attempt-
ing to enforce a contract which was never made, is seeking to 
obtain something which was never paid for, is striving to em-
ploy that which was designed for her protection as an instru-
ment of injustice to the [company] and all its policy holders.'' 
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To like effect see Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. First Nat. Bank, 
(C.C.A. 5th) 113 F.2d 272, 274 [135 A.L.R. 439]; Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. Shalloway, (C.C.A. 5th) supra, 151 F.2d 
548, 550-552; Ginsberg v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 240 
Ala. 299 [198 So. 855, 858-859]; Messina v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., sttpra, 173 Miss. 378 [161 So. 462, 463-464] ; Langan 
v. United States Life Ins. Co., supra, 344 Mo. 989 [130 S.W.2d 
479, 481-483, 123 A.L.R. 1409]; Hall v. Missouri Ins. Co., 
supra (Mo.App.) 208 S.W.2d 830, 832-833; Stean v. Occi-
dental Life Ins. Co., supra, 24 N.M. 346 [171 P. 786, 787]; 
Unterberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 172 N.Y.S. 241, 242; 
Grenis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 154 Misc. 867 
[278 N.Y.S. 137, 138]; Sipp v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 
293 Pa. 292 [142 A. 221, 222] ; Home Life Ins. Co. of Amer-
ica v. Greenspan, 360 Pa. 542 [63 A.2d 72, 75] .) 
While, as heretofore indicated, there is some authority in 
support of defendant's view that the incontestable clause pre-
cludes enforcement of the age adjustment clause after the 
expiration of the specified period for "contest" of the policy, 
notably Muhtal Life Ins. Co. v. New, 125 La. 41 [51 So. 61, 
136 Am.St.Rep. 326, 27 L.R.A.N.S. 431], Arnold v. Equitable 
Life Assur. Soc., (D.C.) 228 F. 157, and Lincoln Health & 
Ace. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 175 Okla. 211 [52 P.2d 793], these cases 
have been respectively distinguished and criticized as unsound 
in Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. First Nat. Bank, (C.C.A. 5th) 
supra, 113 F.2d 272, 274-275, and Langan v. United States 
Life Ins. Co., supra, 344 Mo. 989 [130 S.W.2d 479, 482, 123 
A.L.R. 1409]. 
The incontestable clause and the one fixing the terms of lia-
bility in case of misstatement of age are not inconsistent; 
there is no conflict between the two, but rather they both 
stand, one independent of the other. The like question has 
been the subject of discussion when there appeared a stipu-
lation against liability in case of suicide (Moore v. Bankers' 
Credit Life Ins. Co., s1tpra, 223 Ala. 373 [136 So. 798, 799] ; 
Myers v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 124 Kan. 191 [257 P. 933, 935, 
55 A.L.R. 542] ; Stean v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra, 24 
N.M. 346 [171 P. 786, 787] ; Scales v. Jefferson Standard 
Life Ins. Co., 155 Tenn. 412 [295 S.W. 58, 59, 55 A.L.R. 537] ), 
a contingency provision governing the payment of double 
indemnity (Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 
(C.C.A. 5th) 10 F.2d 143, 144), a limitation dependent upon 
the cause of death (Darden v. North American Ben. Assn., 
170 Va. 479 [197 S.E. 413, 415] ), or a restriction relieving 
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from responsibility to pay disability benefits (Cohen v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 32 Cal.App.2d 337, 346 [89 P.2d 732] ; 
Fohl v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal.App.2d 368, 377 
[129 P.2d 24]). In all such instances the provisions, as part 
of the parties' agreement, have been enforced, notwithstand-
ing the insertion of a stipulation limiting the right of contest. 
[6] Such distinction of a "contest of the policy" from a 
controversy as to policy coverage simply rests on the well-
recognized principle that "where there has been no assumption 
of the risk, there can be no liability." (Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Conway, st~pra, 252 N.Y. 449 [169 N.E. 642, 643] ; see, 
also, Equitable Life Ass~tr. Soc. v. First Nat. Bank, (C.C.A. 
5th) supra, 113 F.2d 272, 276; Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., supra, 32 Cal.App.2d 337, 346.) 
[7] In construing life insurance policies as in the construc-
tion of other contracts, the entire contract is to be construed 
together for the purpose of giving force and effect to each 
clause. ( 44 C.J.S. p. 1136, § 289; p. 1196, § 298; Civ. Code, 
§ 1641; Ogburn v. Travelers Ins. Co., 207 Cal. 50, 52-53 [276 P. 
1004]; Security Tntst & Sav. Bank v. New York Indem. Co., 
220 Cal. 372, 377 [31 P.2d 365].) [8] While it is settled 
law that in case of doubt the provisions of the insurance con-
tract will be construed most strongly against the insurer 
( 44 C.J.S. p. 1166, § 297 c (1) ; Fageol Trtwk & Coach Co. v. 
Pacific Indern. Co., 18 Cal.2d 731, 747 [117 P.2d 661]; M1Itual 
Life Ins. Co. v. Mm·gol1:s, 11 Cal.App.2d 382, 387-388 [53 P. 
2d 1017]), the rule is equally well established that where the 
terms of the policy are plain and explicit, the court will indulge 
in no forced construction so as to cast a liability upon the 
insurance company which it has not assumed ( 44 C.J.S. 
p. 1190, § 297c(2); Burr v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 211 
Cal. 568, 576 [296 P. 273]). [9] In the interpretation of 
any written instrument, the primary object is to ascertain and 
carry out the intention of the parties. ( 44 C.J.S. p. 1146, 
§ 291; Civ. Code, § 1636; Ogburn v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra, 
207 Cal. 50, 52.) So here, the age adjustment clause is clear 
and explicit in its measure of the liability assumed by plain-
tiff; it goes directly to the risk expressed in the terms of the 
policy according to the ''correct age'' of the insured. As 
such qualification on the coverage intended by the policy, it is 
not affected by the time limitation prescribed in the incon-
testable clause, at the end of which period plaintiff was bound 
to the full extent of the risk it had assumed but it was not 
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liable on a risk it had stipulated it would not assume-cover-
age that was not premised on defendant's ''correct age.'' To 
hold otherwise and to the effect that the incontestable clause 
nullified the provision of the age adjustment clause would do 
violence to the clear intention of the parties plainly and un-
ambiguously expressed. (Meh·opolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shal-
loway, (C.C.A. 5th) supra, 151 F.2d 548, 551-552; Ginsberg 
v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra, 240 Ala. 299 [198 So. 
855, 858] ; Murphy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., s~tpra, 134 Misc. 
238 [234 N.Y.S. 278, 280] .) 
The ''correct age of insurants is the chief corner-stone of 
the life insurance structure" (Langan v. United States Life 
Ins. Co., supra, 344 Mo. 988 [130 S.W.2d 479, 483, 123 A.L.R. 
1409] ), with rates "based on mortality tables, worked out by 
actuaries'' and premiums adjusted according to ''life expec-
tancy" experience (Ginsberg v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 
supra, 240 Ala. 299 [198 So. 855, 858]). In accord with such 
basic principle affecting the bargaining premise of the parties 
in their insurance contract, the age adjustment clause is in-
cluded in the policy. (58 C.J.S. pp. 1210-1211.) The clear 
import of such clause is the agreement that any understatement 
of age, whether intentional or not, shall not be relied upon as 
a misrepresentation avoiding the policy within the purport 
of the incontestable clause but rather, in such event of mis-
statement, the full amount payable under the policy shall be 
the sum which the premiums paid would have purchased at 
the correct age. This is manifestly fair to both parties in 
effecting the "correct age" adjustment, whether the benefit 
redound to the insurer because of an understatement or to the 
insured because of an overstatement. It would be untenable to 
hold that the age adjustment clause should have effect only 
during the contest period prescribed by the policy as required 
by statute, and then become innocuous, for then the compre-
hensive age balance constituting the "corner-stone of the life 
insurance structure'' would be completely distorted through 
conferring ''all the benefits of the age adjustment clause on the 
insured'' by inviting him to ''understate his age, get by with 
it until the time for adjustment had l)assed, and thereupon be-
come secure in the advantage he had so gained." (Ginsberg v. 
Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra, 240 Ala. 299 [198 So. 855, 
858] .) It must be remembered that ordinarily the age of the 
applicant for insurance does not affect the acceptability of 
the risk, and admittedly plaintiff would have issued the policy 
as readily to defendant at age 47 as at age 45 years, with the 
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age factor simply operating to fix the insurance premiums 
according to the established mortality tables. [10] Accord-
ingly, the age adjustment clause cannot be held to conflict 
with the incontestable clause but rather, as an independent 
provision of the insurance contract, it expresses the parties' 
agreement for the correction of errors consistent with their 
rights and obligations during the life of the policy. (Langan 
v. United States Life Ins. Co., supra, 344 Mo. 988 [130 S.W.2d 
479, 481-483, 123 A.L.R. 1409] .) 
In further objection to plaintiff's right to relief here, de-
fendant cites the case of Richardson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
(C.C.A. 9th) 171 F.2d 699, for its holding that reformation 
of an insurance policy on the ground of mistake is barred after 
the expiration of the prescribed period in the incontestable 
clause. That case involved the attempt of the insurance com-
pany to reform the policy to express the true agreement of the 
parties, and such relief was denied. Whether or not the 
Richardson case was correctly decided (cf. notes, 62 Harv.L. 
Rev. 890; 97 Univ. of Pa.L.Rev. 741), it is nevertheless clearly 
distinguishable. 
In the Richardson case it appears that through a mistake 
of the insurance company a pension policy was issued to the 
insured instead of a life insurance policy on a so-called "Uni-
form Premium Plan,'' there being a considerable difference 
in the benefits and the amount of premiums between the types 
of policies. Twenty years later the company sought to rectify 
the mistake through reformation of the policy, and the court 
held that in the face of the one-year incontestable clause, the 
company's action was tantamount to a contest of the terms of 
the policy itself and could not be maintained. But there the 
company was seeking to vary the express terms of the parties' 
written contract and to substitute therefor a policy containing 
entirely different provisions. Upon citation of Dibble v. Reli-
ance Life Ins. Co., sttpra, 170 Cal. 199, where the incontestable 
clause was applied in limitation of the insurance company's 
right to cancel a policy because of alleged fraudulent repre-
sentations by the insured, the court in the Richardson case 
designated the mistake of the insurance company to be, like 
fraud, an "inception defense," which must be litigated within 
the stated period of the incontestable clause. 
The situation here is quite different in that plaintiff is seek-
ing a reformation of the policy in accordance with the express 
terms of the age adjustment clause thereof, an enforcement of 
the provisions of the parties' insurance contract rather than 
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a variance therefrom. As so distinguished, the Richardson 
case may properly be limited as a decision holding that in the 
absence of any other pertinent contractual provision, the in-
contestable clause bars the insurance company from setting up 
mistake as a ground for reformation after lapse of the con-
testable period. While it is true that the mistake as to defend-
ant's age arose at the inception of the policy and was then sub-
ject to correction, it does not appear reasonable to conclude 
that when the parties' contract expressly provided for an ad-
justment to rectify such inaccuracy, plaintiff nevertheless had 
the burden of making discovery of such error and was bound 
to litigate that misstatement within the two-year contestable 
period or be foreclosed from having the correction of defend-
ant's age square with the fact. Rather, it would seem, as said 
in Gr·enis v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, 154 Misc. 867 [278 
N.Y.S. 137], at page 138 [278 N.Y.S.], "the consequences 
of the discovery of the true age of the insured are operative 
without relation to time. No matter when the discovery is 
made, the benefits would be adjusted accordingly .... [The 
correction] does not destroy but harmonizes with the intent 
and spirit of the incontestability provision that the adjustment 
of the benefits be regulated according to age, whenever the 
age is revealed, even though the revelation be subsequent to 
the [contestable period]." Under the circumstances, the ordi-
nary rules of equity sustain plaintiff's right to a reformation 
of the policy to accord with "the contract of insurance pro-
viding the method of the fair and honest adjustment of the 
rights of the parties." (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Trilling, 
194 App.Div. 178 [184 N.Y.S. 898, 902] ; see 44 C.J.S. p. 
1108, § 278; Ginsberg v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra, 
240 Ala. 299 [198 So. 855, 859], and cases there cited.) 
Before leaving this portion o£ the discussion, it may be well 
to state that as plaintiff was relying upon the terms of the 
contract as written, an action for declaratory relief (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1060) would have afforded an equally appropri-
ate remedy to determine the rights and duties of the parties 
thereunder. While the remedy of reformation was properly 
invoked, the point which should be stressed is that the nature 
of the reformation which plaintiff sought, unlike that sought 
in the Richardson case and in certain other cited cases, was 
entirely in line with the agreement of the parties as expressed 
within the four corners of their written contract. 
[11] Defendant finally contends that since the parties 
agreed that the "policy and the application therefor ... con-
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stitute the entire contract'' and that ''this policy shall be in-
contestable,'' plaintiff may not controvert defendant's age 
statement by resort to evidence outside the express provisions 
of their insurance contract. This argument is untenable as 
applied to plaintiff's right to adjust the terms of its coverage 
according to the risk assumed. As said in Cohen v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., supra, 32 Cal.App.2d 337, at page 346: 
''An incontestable clause in an insurance policy does not ex-
tend the coverage beyond the terms of the policy." Thus in 
the Cohen case, as in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Markowitz, 62 Cal.App.2d 388 [144 P.2d 899], the incontest-
able clause of the policy did not foreclose the insurance com-
pany from introducing evidence in dispute of the insured's 
statements on his insurance application and to show the in-
sured's claim for disability benefits was without the terms of 
the company's agreed coverage in that the disability had oc-
curred prior to the effective date of the policy. (See, also, 
Fohl v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, 54 Cal.App.2d 368, 
377.) So in the present case, in determining a question of 
insurance coverage, the matter of defendant's "correct age" 
would be ''open to investigation during the life of the policy, 
and if a misstatement as to it is discovered it [would] not avoid 
the policy, but 'any amount payable under it' ... [must] 
be adjusted to the true age" (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
ShaUoway, (C.C.A. 5th) sttpra, 151 F.2d 548, 551-552); and 
material to the determination of that issue would be ''definite 
statements or declarations of the person whose age is in ques-
tion, n:ade by him during his lifetime on solemn occasions when 
it was his bounden dnty to speak the truth, and when there 
was no motive or occasion, actual or supposed, on his part to 
speak other than the truth" (Messina v. New York Life Ins. 
Co., suprn, 173 Miss. 378 r161 So. 462, 464]; see, also, Langan 
v. Un1:ted States L1:fe Ins. Co., sttpra, 344 Mo. 989 [130 S.W. 
2d 479, 483, 123 A.L.R. 1409]: Sipp v. Phaadelphia Life Ins. 
Ins. Co., S11pra, 293 Pa. 292 r142 A. 221, 223-224] ; Home Life 
Ins. Co. of America v. GTeenspan, snpra, 360 Pa. 542 [63 A.2i! 
72, 7 41). Accordingly, it follows that the trial court here 
erred in excluding admissions made by defendant on other 
rlocumentary statements as to the date of birth. Since the 
right to recover moneys paid by an insurance company under 
a mistake as to the policy coverage, and in reliance upon the 
insured's representations in his application, has been recog-
nized in this state as without the scope of the incontestable 
clause (Cohen v. JJ1etropoUtan Life Ins. Co., supra, 32 CaL 
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App.2d 337, 346-347; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Markowitz, supra, 62 Cal.App.2d 388, 397-398), plaintiff prop-
erly invokes the same reasoning as applicable in support of its 
action for reformation of the policy here involved to preclude 
the payment of moneys which would be subject to recovery if 
later discovered to have been paid under a mistake as to cov-
erage liability. 
[12] Defendant argues that if plaintiff prevails in its proof 
on the age issue, it will succeed in avoiding the disability bene-
fits and the waiver of premiums provided in the policy. But 
that was a condition of the policy coverage to which the par-
ties specifically agreed, and the principle of decision cannot 
be affected by "hardships, advantages or disadvantages which 
may result from ... a construction" of the insurance con-
tract according to the parties' intent plainly and unambigu-
ously expressed. ( Ogb~trn v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra, 207 
Cal. 50, 52; also B~trr v. Western States Life Ins. Co., supra, 
211 Cal. 568, 576.) So pertinent is Chief Justice Cardozo's 
observation in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, supra, 
252 N.Y. 449 [169 N.E. 642], at page 643 [169 N.E.] : "A 
provision for incontestability does not have the effect of con-
verting a promise to pay on the happening of a stated con-
tingency into a promise to pay whether such contingency does 
or does not happen." (Also Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. 
Rothstein, 122 N.J.Ch. 606 [195 A. 723, 724) .) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., White, J. pro tern., and Wood 
(Parker), J. pro tern., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The decision reached here by the majority of this court is 
another instance where lip-service is paid to a salutary rule 
by recognizing its existence only to find that under the facts 
presented it has no application. The rule to which I refer 
is the old and just one-that a contract of insurance shall be 
construed most strictly against the insurer. 
The incontestability clause in the policy under considera-
tion here provided that ''This Policy shall be incontestable 
after two years from its date of issue except for non-payment 
of premium and except as to the provisions and conditions re-
lating to disability and Double Indemnity Benefits." In 
spite of the fact that none of the three exceptions is involved 
here, the majority of this court cites many authorities in sup-
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port of the following statement: ''It is generally held that 
the incontestable clause, after the lapse of time it specifies, 
prevents nullification of the insurance contract for any cause 
not excepted in the cla~(Se." Of course, it is explained that 
what we have here is not a nullification of the contract, and 
not a contest, but only an effort to have the policy enforced 
according to its terms. This explanation is achieved by hold-
ing that the age adjustment clause if the age of the insured 
has been misstated, the amount payable hereunder shall be 
such as the premium paid would have purchased at the correct 
age) is not within the scope of the incontestable clause. 
To hold that the insurer here is not contesting the policy 
is to play with words. The insurer is resisting payment of 
part of the face value of the policy despite the fact that it is 
claimed that it seeks only to enforce it according to its value 
as reformed. No matter what the insurer claims, this action 
destroys the validity of the policy in part. In Arnold v. Equi-
table Life Assttr. Soc. of U. S., 228 F. 157, the court said that 
under the terms of the policy no one would contend that the 
defendant could make an absolute defense upon the ground of 
misrepresentation as to age, so if it could not make a defense 
to the whole policy, how could it make a defense to it in part? 
And yet the defendant there, as here, denied liability for the 
face value but admitted liability for a smaller sum, the denial 
being based upon misrepresentation in the application for 
insurance. The court concluded that the partial defense pleaded 
could not be sustained. 
An incontestable clause in an insurance policy is intended 
to free the beneficiary from delay, annoyance and expense in 
acquiring the amount which had been carefully provided. 
Premiums on life insurance policies are often paid at a great 
sacrifice, and one of the most disturbing and unsatisfactory 
features of the insurance contract is the fact that, after these 
sacrifices and payments have been made for a number of 
years, and the insured has died, so that his testimony and 
perhaps that of others has been rendered unavailable by the 
lapse of time and the occurrence of death, instead of receiving 
the promised reward, the beneficiary will be met with a contest 
and a lawsuit to determine whether the insurance ever had 
any validity or force. Hence it has become an almost univer-
sal practice with insurance companies to provide against any 
contest or forfeiture of their policies after a certain length 
of time, greater in some cases and less in others (Clement v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Tenn. 22 [46 S.W. 561, 70 Am.St. 
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Rep. 650,42 L.R.A. 247] .) As was said in Humpston v. State 
Mut. Life Assur. Co., 148 Tenn. 439, 441, 467 [256 S.W. 438, 
31 A.L.R. 78] : '"l'he incontestable clause in the policies sued 
on was written into them by the defendant [insurance com-
pany] itself. It was contractual, and the effect of it was to 
prevent the insurer from interposing as a defense the falsity 
of the representations of the insured, which might be fraudu-
lent. In other words, defendant said to the insured : 'I will 
take one year in which to ascertain whether your representa-
tions are false, and whether you have been guilty of any fraud 
in obtaining the contract and, if within that period, I do not 
ascertain or discover such falsity and fraud, I agree to make 
no further inquiry into these matters, and make no defense 
on account of them.' " It is my belief that this is a correct 
analysis of the purpose of the incontestable clause in a policy 
of insurance. It is most definitely within the power of the 
insurer to include any exceptions it wishes to make within the 
cla'use itself, or specifically to refer to other clauses which it 
would make a part of the incontestable clause. 
We are told here that when an insurance policy by its pro-
visions is made incontestable after a specified period, as this 
one was, that the intent of the parties is to fix a limited time 
within which the insurer must discover and assert any grounds 
it might have to justify a rescission of the contract; that ac-
cordingly, the insurer must make its ''contest of the policy'' 
within the prescribed period, either by the institution of a 
suit to cancel the policy or by setting up misrepresentation 
or fraud in the procurement of the policy as a defense in an 
action brought by the insured or the beneficiary. As I have 
pointed out, the present action is a ''contest'' as to part of 
the policy whether or not it is actually called that. 
We are also told that the correct age of insurants is the 
chief cornerstone of the life insurance structure but that "it 
does not appear reasonable to conclude that when the parties' 
contract expressly provided for an adjustment to rectify such 
inaccuracy, plaintiff nevertheless had the burden of making 
discovery of such error and was bound to litigate that misstate-
ment within the two-year contestable period or be foreclosed 
from having the eorrection of defendant's age square with the 
fact.'' To my mind, if the eorrect age of the applicant is of 
such vital importance to life insurance companies, it would 
appear to be mueh more reasonable to require the insurers 
to discover any such errors than to hold that the incontestable 
clause does not apply. 
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It would be as simple, and far more just, for this court to 
hold that the clause providing for adjustment when a mis-
statement of age has occurred, prevents rescission of the entire 
contract, provides for reformation so that the amount pay-
able shall correspond to that which the premium paid would 
have purchased at the correct age, and that this reformation 
must take place within the time limited in the clause preventing 
a contest after the two-year period. In so doing, effect would 
be given to both the incontestable clause and the misstatement 
of age clause because both are general clauses, neither con-
trolling the other. Thus both general clauses are construed 
together and effect given to both. In Lincoln Health & Ace. 
Ins. Co. v. Jones, 175 Okla. 211 [52 P.2d 793], the court 
pointed out that the company had, in such a situation, ample 
time to make inquiry about the age of the insured within the 
two years after the date of the policy. That if the insured 
understated his age, the company might have readjusted the 
policy on the basis of true age, but after two years had elapsed 
defenses are no longer available unless the grounds are ex-
cepted by the ter·ms of the policy. It was concluded that the 
misstatement of age provision can only be taken advantage of 
by the insurance company during the two-year period provided 
for by the incontestable clause. (See, also, Mut1wl Life Ins. 
Co. of New York v. New, 125 La. 41 [51 So. 61, 136 Am.St. 
Rep. 326, 27 L.R.A. 431]; Mitchell v. Pennsylvania M1d. Life, 
90 Pa.Super. 426; Arnold v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 
supra, 228 F. 157.) 
If the foregoing construction is placed upon the policy here 
involved, the contract of insurance will be construed most 
strongly against the insurer, as it should be. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached by Jus-
tice Carter. 
The argument that in this case the incontestable clause 
should not be operative because it would work an injustice 
on other insureds goes too far. On that reasoning the incon-
testable clause could be held utterly meaningless in any case 
of misrepresentation or innocent mistake as to a material 
matter of fact. 
It seems incongruous to me to recognize the express declara-
tions of the policy that the ''policy and the application there-
for [in which the insured's age is stated] ... constitute the 
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entire contract"; that "This policy shall be incontestable 
after two years from the date of its issue except for non-pay-
ment of premium and except as to the provisions and condi-
tions relating to Disability and Double Indemnity Benefits'' ; 
and then to hold that "the matter of defendant's 'correct age' 
would be 'open to investigation during the life of the policy'." 
The exceptions to the incontestable clause above quoted are 
specific; they do not include misstatement of age. 
The majority, as I understand their opinion, avoid giving 
effect to the two-year contest limitation in the incontestable 
clause by holding that this action to reform the policy is 
not a contest of liability under it. Yet these facts are un-
escapable: (1) On the face of the contract and the facts es-
tablished, accepting the age statement as true, the insurer 
is liable to pay $50 a month to the insured, commencing Octo-
ber 15, 1945, and to waive premiums falling due under the 
policy from and after June 15, 1945. On the date of trial 
the amount prima facie due to the insured was $2,400 in dis-
ability payments plus $875.60 in premiums paid under pro-
test, a total of $3,275.60. (2) The insurer refuses to pay any 
part of this sum except that it would refund what it claims 
are overpayments of premiums made since April 10, 1944, 
which date it alleges is ''the anniversary of said policy on 
which the insured's nearest birthday was sixty." (3) The 
insurer asks that ''said policy of insurance . . . be reformed 
by changing the face amount thereof [from $5,000] to $4,632 
and by reducing the semi-annual premiums . . . payable under 
said policy ... from and after April 10, 1944" and that 
''the application of . . . [the insured J . . . be reformed by 
changing the date of birth of said insured from April, 1886 to 
April, 1884." ( 4) The payment of disability benefits and the 
waiver of premium are conditioned on disability occurring be-
fore age 60; under the facts here alleged by the insurer, if the 
policy and application are reformed as sought by it, it will 
avoid entirely the payment of such benefits and the waiver of 
premiums. ( 5) The insured was born in Russia and there is 
no showing that the exact date of his birth was recorded or 
can be proved with certainty. The policy was applied for on 
April 10, 1931; it was issued on April 16, 1931; this suit for 
reformation was filed December 11, 1946. It is reasonable to 
believe that it would have been easier for the insured to find 
and produce evidence as to the date of his birth within two 
years from the time the policy was issued than after the lapse 
of more than 15 years. Hence the recital in the policy (which 
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includes the application) of the date of birth is a matter as 
to which the contest limitation period of two years is reason-
able and appropriate. 
It seems to me that the relief sought by the insurer, under 
the circumstances shown, amounts to a contest of its policy; 
certainly it is a contest of the insured's claim under the policy 
and his claim finds prima facie support in the policy and at-
tached application. It is only by showing misrepresentation or 
mistake as to the insured's age that his claim is sought to be 
avoided. Since misrepresentation or mistake as to age is not 
listed as an exception to the limitation on contestability after 
two years, I think the trial judge was justified in the conclu-
sions he reached. At most there is ambiguity in the policy 
which ambiguity, of course, was created by the insurer. As· 
indicated above, it well may be difficult for the insured at this 
late date, particularly since he was born in a foreign country, 
to prove the exact date of his birth. 
For the reasons stated I would resolve the ambiguity against 
the insurer and affirm the judgment. 
The opinion was modified to read as above printed and 
respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
20, 1951. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[L.A. No. 21675. In Bank. Nov. 27, 1951.] 
FRANK GONSALVES, JR., et al., Respondents, v. FRANK 
W. HODGSON et al., Appellants. 
[1a, 1b] Trusts-Existence of Trust or Fiduciary Relationship.-
No trust or fiduciary relationship is created by or arises out 
of the dealings of the parties to a contract to construct a ship 
in a workmanlike manner in dependence on the special skill 
and knowledge of one of the builders, payment to be made in 
installments as construction progresses, where the parties en-
gage in a course of arms-length dealing throughout, and the 
buyers retain supervisory rights of control on all phases of 
construction. (Civ. Code, §§ 2216, 2217, 2221.) 
[2] !d.-Property Subject to Trust.-The special knowledge or 
skill which a man possesses is not property which may be held 
in trust; it can be subject only to a contractual obligation. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 18; [2] Trusts, § 13; [3] 
Contracts, § 213; [4] Shipping, § 31; [5] Fraud, § 87; [6] Fraud, 
§ 5. 
